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I. INTRODUCTION

Economic reforms in several Latin American countries in the last
fifteen years have brought some challenging questions to constitutional
law, such as: "What is the role ofconstitutionalism in progressive politics?
How should we face the dilemma between the 'social constitutional party'
and the 'liberal statutory party'?"'
Such a dilemma between these two parties, or between the Brazilian
Constitution and the statutory law is not entirely true in Brazil. The tide of
the so-called "neoliberal reforms" did not have an impact on subconstitutional law alone. In fact, this conflict rages within the Brazilian
Constitution itself; a document which has been under intense reform for
years. Not only does the impact of "neoliberalism" in Brazil neglect to
spare the Brazilian Constitution, but also has it as a primary object for
reform. As we shall see, this is due to some peculiarities in the text of the
Brazilian Constitution.
At any rate, the challenge of thinking about the role of Brazilian
constitutionalism in progressive politics leads me to a number of other
questions. I would like to list some of them, not as a rhetorical strategy,
but because, faced with such an intricate theme, I feel I still do not have
clear answers for many of the questions it poses. Does the constitutionalist
have anything to say, from a substantive standpoint, about all this process
of structural reforms in the economy? Does he have anything to say about
"neoliberalism?"
The constitutionalist has a crucial role within a constitutional
democracy. Above all, he is expected to offer sound arguments for the
protection of the fundamental rights, not in the courts alone, but also in the
various institutional spaces which form the public sphere. Such rights
include today not only those derived of classic liberalism but also those of
social and economic character which require the State to perform quite
complex and costly tasks in the implementation of public policies of
promotion and redistribution in these areas.
If, as a first thought, the so-called neoliberal reforms do not have a
direct impact on rights - as it seems to be the case in Brazil - but if they
only alter the ways in which the state acts in the economic arena, how can
one resist them by using the Brazilian Constitution? Can the Brazilian
Constitution be an effective tool in resisting transnational economic
movements which threaten the ability of national states to promote
fundamental rights - as modem constitutionalism promises?

1. These questions were presented in the program of Latcrit's "South-North Exchange on
Theory, Culture and Law" (Puerto Rico, Dec. 2004), where this Paper was debated.
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Is the Brazilian Constitution compatible with neoliberalism? Does it
protect us from neoliberalism? Do the "cliusulas ptreas ' 2 forbid
neoliberal reforms? As of today, we do not have a comprehensive enough
analysis on the topic, one that articulates all its conflicts and institutional
effects - and understandably so, as this is still an ongoing process.
I would like, nevertheless, to offer a brief report of the Brazilian case
and bring a few questions that constitutional theory poses for anyone
trying to analyze these phenomena. Such questions, due to their theoretical
nature, transcend the Brazilian case insofar they present phenomena
common to all contemporary democracies, especially since they are
usually called the judicialization of politics.
My goal is, therefore -

in spite of this long introduction -

not to

make a judgment on the value of such constitutional reforms. As
neoliberalism has become an ideologically charged topic, and as the term
"neoliberal" itself was transformed into a derogatory adjective, public
debate has often incurred in a mistaken identification, monolithically, all
and every "neoliberal" reform as incompatible with the principles of social
justice. To avoid such misunderstanding I will thus refrain from assessing
them here.
What I would like to discuss, however, is the decision process through
which such themes have been absorbed by Brazilian constitutional
institutions. More specifically, I would like to discuss the possibility of the
judicial control of the constitutionality of constitutional amendments.
Three less ambitious questions are the center of this presentation: what is
the institutional consequence of admitting the judicial control of
constitutional amendments? Why should such control be seen as a
problem? How should or could a theory of democracy look at this
phenomenon?
This presentation has five parts. Parts II, I1,and IV present, briefly, the
Brazilian case so that it may be analyzed later on. Part II presents some
aspects of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution. Part III describes the process
of reform the Constitution underwent in the 1990s. Part IV shows the
judicial battle such reforms entailed and the stand the Brazilian Supreme
Court took in the control of amendments. Finally, in part V, I will offer my
analysis, in which I will attempt to place the Brazilian case within a theory
of democracy.

2. "Cidusulas pdtreas" are the constitutional clauses that cannot be altered by constitutional
amendments.
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II. THE BRAZILIAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1988

The 1988 Brazilian Constitution appeared at a very special moment.
The final product of a transition to democracy after twenty-one years of
military rule, it bears witness, in its text, to the specificity of that moment.
The overthrowing of the military regime, by itself, entailed a multitude of
social demands which had previously been repressed or silenced by
political violence. Apart from that, it was one of the last moments of the
directive kind of constitutionalism, with its strong intention of bringing
social change through a vigorous state intervention in the economy and in
society.
At that point, inscribing into the Brazilian Constitution the demands of
each social movement was a symbolic and legitimizing act which had to
be performed. Everything that was seen as relevant for the state to promote
or protect had to be in the constitution, even if in the most generic form,
and even if the form of its implementation was left to the statutory law.
With the Brazilian Constitution, such social movements gained one more
weapon to push their demands forward. The text that sprung up from this
political catharsis bears the marks of a whole set of opposed and
controversial demands.
From a comparativist point of view, the Brazilian Constitution of 1988
is surprising as it goes far beyond the fundamental constitutional
compromises, even within the context of the directive kind of
constitutionalism, in which the "economic Constitution" was added to the
underlying political pact. Its lengthy text puts together minute detail and
casuism with all-encompassing abstract principles. It burdens statutory
lawmakers with the task of regulating a number of principles. It deals with
typically constitutional issues - with a large section for the guarantee of
rights - but it also covers the tax system, the economic area, public
policies and administration, social security, and a vast array of other topics.
The 1988 Constitution has an important innovation vis-A-vis its seven
predecessors. It sets explicit limits to constitutional reform, and these
limits are listed in the so-called "cldusulas p~treas." Such precaution is
not, to speak the truth, unheard of in Brazilian constitutional history, once
five other Republican constitutions (with the exception of that of 1937)
prohibited amendments suppressing the federation and the republican form
of government. What sets the 1988 Constitution apart is the fact that it
transforms into "cliusulas p~treas" a large number of individual rights.
From a wordy, lengthy, and fragmented text, it extracted a normative core
not to be changed by future generations.
The Brazilian Constitution put it upon itself to play a leading role in
progressive politics and in the promotion of social justice. It points to the
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future and it shows where it wants to get to. It limited the autonomy of the
statutory lawmakers once it determined its role to pre-establish not only
the goals of the State, but also the adequate means to achieve them.
III. GOVERNING

BY CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: SIXTEEN
YEARS OF THE NEW REPUBLIC

The governments following the 1988 Constitution did not blindly
follow its commands insofar as economic goals were concerned. Due to
the encompassing character of the constitutional text, which limited
ordinary political choices, a major orientation emerged: to govern one
must start by reforming the Brazilian Constitution. Throughout the
electoral periods which followed the 1988 Constitution, there was not a
single political party that did not include constitutional reform in its
political program.
But there is still another critical element to understand this period: just
a few years after it came into effect, the Brazilian Constitution started
facing external pressure for changes.4 No sooner had the Brazilian
Constitution become a reality, then the model which produced the reforms
began to show signs of exhaustion. The making of the Brazilian
Constitution had been a celebration of a directive kind of
constitutionalism. Right after that, it started to fall apart. The 1988
Constitution, with its "directive intent" seems to have been born out of
sync with its own time.5
In stark opposition to the interventionist program of the original makers
of the Brazilian Constitution, the constitutional reformers had a vast task
ahead of them. Neoliberalism, in this sense, was filtered by the Brazilian
State having, as a departing point, the strategy of getting rid of those
constitutional elements which impaired the function of the free market.
Sixteen years after its promulgation, the 1988 Constitution has been
reformed forty-two times and tens of other amendment projects are being
or have been examined by Congress. This multitude of amendments shows
that, in Brazil, the "poder constituinte derivado" (assembly power to
amend the constitution) is performed by a permanent political agent, which

3. Reforming the Constitution was, for example, a routine in the governments of Presidents
Fernando Collor de Mello, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula.
4. Oscar Vilhena Vieira, Realinhamento constitucional,in DIRETO GLOBAL (Max Limonad
ed., 1999).
5. Id.
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lives along and gets mixed with the ordinary lawmakers and which cannot
be seen as a chance political agent.
An ever-changing constitution begets perplexity. In sheer numeric
terms, the Brazilian Constitution has in fact received a large number of
amendments. This observation, however, tells very little in itself. A closer,
qualitative examination shows that the Constitution has not been
fundamentally changed, nor has its original project been abandoned
insofar its political architecture and the protection of rights are concerned.
Some amendments, however, created room for new ways of State
intervention in the economy.
In concrete terms, the amendments altered the original structure of the
text less than one might suppose. The amendments deriving from neoliberal ideas affected the bureaucracy of the State (through administrative
reform), and public finances (from changes in the tax and social security
areas). For example, these ideas eliminated the special regime for national
companies and ended the monopoly of a number of sectors in the economy
which were previously run exclusively by the state.
Although one might regret the new developments in the State's
economy which these amendments have created, there also have been
important institutional gains. The most obvious - albeit not always
noticed - is the acknowledgment by the political forces that the Brazilian
Constitution is a norm to be taken seriously. In the past, ignoring
constitutional norms was not much of a problem. In recent years, there is
no thinking of ignoring the Brazilian Constitution. When it stood in the
way of some state interest, the political forces faced the inevitable
marathon of political negotiations to reform it.
In the face of all these amendments, two questions remain: Whether the
material limits to the power of amending the constitutional text have
played their role? Is there any "cliusula p6trea" which serves as an island
of resistance to the changes in the economy? These questions lead us to the
two ensuing parts which analyze the arguments underlying the assumption
that constitutional supremacy can only be effective if there is judicial
control of constitutionality that is operational.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE BRAZILIAN SUPREME COURT IN THE CONTROL OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

The Brazilian Supreme Court is at the heart of the complex system of
constitutional control. The current Brazilian system ofjudicial review can
be better understood if, instead of looking to the 1988 text only, we look
at its historical formation. It was inspired in the American judicial review,
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as an exclusively incidental control, established in the First Republican
Constitution of 1891. In the following decades, other devices for a greater
centralization of control were created, in a manner which complemented
and did not suppress - the original pattern.
A proper centralized control was created in 1965 through a
constitutional amendment. It can only be legally exerted, however, by the
Attorney General who is subordinated to the President. This reform has the
mark of a Brazilian model which still exists. For example, this is similar
to a hybrid model, which creates a conflict between the incidental model,
boldly carried out by single judges, and the centralized system, which can
only be exerted by the Brazilian Supreme Court.
The 1988 Constitution, in spite of maintaining this hybrid model,
transformed it. This Constitution radically enlarged the number of those
capable of exerting the centralized constitutional jurisdiction including,
among others, state agents, political parties, unions, and the OAB (The
Brazilian Bar Association).
This enlarging of the numbers of actors changed the position of the
Brazilian Supreme Court within the political system in Brazil. The Court
became an active part in key political debates; it became an arena in which
the most varied political and social conflicts are fought. The act of
interpreting the Brazilian Constitution becomes an everyday task in the
legal profession. The political battles waged in Congress are taken, by the
political parties defeated, to the Court where the same battle is fought
again, - but now translated into constitutional language.
The Brazilian Supreme Court establishes itself, then, as a "super
power." Two reasons for that have already been mentioned. First, the
access to the Brazilian Supreme Court has become easier. Second, the allencompassing nature of the 1988 text, with its minute details and its
overbroad principles, makes it possible for virtually every legislative
decision to be questioned.
A third aspect reinforces, yet again, this preeminence of the Brazilian
Supreme Court. It is that of the possibility of constitutional control via
constitutional amendments. It is not hard to understand this mechanism.
Since there are articles which cannot be altered even by amendments,
every amendment that disrespects this core rules can be declared
unconstitutional by the Brazilian Supreme Court. The "cliusulas prtreas"
create a material hierarchy within the text. The same logic the Brazilian
Supreme Court uses to test the constitutionality of ordinary laws, it uses
to test that of any given amendment vis-i-vis the "cldusulas prtreas."
In practice, this constitutional jurisdiction has become an arena for the
discussion of neoliberalism, mainly when it appears in the form of a
constitutional amendment. The way the Brazilian Supreme Court has been
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receiving neoliberal ideas is far from being free of controversy. The most
important constitutional amendments have been taken to the Brazilian
Supreme Court. In three of these cases, the Court has declared the
unconstitutionality of the amendment, something almost unheard of in
modem constitutionalism.6
This practice of judicial control of amendments is widely accepted in
Brazilian constitutional doctrine. There is a curious reason for that; the
Brazilian Constitution does not explicitly grant the Brazilian Supreme
Court the power to control constitutional amendments. As Justice Marshall
affrmned in Marbury v. Madison, the power of the Court is based on
deductive reasoning springing from the notions of normative hierarchy and
constitutional supremacy, without a clear textual basis, that affirms its own
power. It never hesitated to acknowledge that it had this power. The
Brazilian Supreme Court decision to control the constitutional amendment
springs from a similar inference: if the Brazilian Constitution is the
supreme norm, there must be an independent Brazilian institution which
controls the acts of other Brazilian organizations. The problems inherent
in this kind of reasoning have already been discussed by a number of
authors and they are not the object of this presentation. 7
The discussion I would like to propose is not about the interpretation
of the Brazilian Constitution. It is at a pre-constitutional level and it has
to do with the assumptions which guide and justify different institutional
formats. The arrangement adopted by the 1988 Constitution places the
Brazilian Supreme Court as the last link in the state decision chain. If the
Court and the lawmaker disagree on any matter (assuming, obviously, that
constitutional normality will not be threatened), it is the Court's decision
which will prevail. After a long circuit, the Court has the last word and
may end any dialogue creating a situation which can only be reversed, in
the words of Justice Marco Aurdlio,8 "by a revolution, in which the might
of weapons, and not that of the law, prevails." What does that mean from
the perspective of a democratic government? It is about this arrangement
that I would like to talk now.

6. The main case in which Brazilian Supreme Court declared the unconstitutionality of an
amendment was the "Aqdo Direta de Inconstitucionalidade - ACI n. 926/1993. Harris v. Minister
of the Interior, 1952 S. Afr. Case; Minerva Mills v. Union of India, 1980 India Case. I thank my
friend Dimitri Dimoulis for this commentary.
7. CARLOS SANTiAGO NINo, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 187-216
(1996).
8. Declaration to O Estado de Sio Paulo, in January 15,2003. Justice of Supremo Tribunal
Federal - STF.
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V. WHAT DOES JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

MEAN TO DEMOCRACY?

I have finally arrived at the exact point I wanted to discuss here. I
intend now to consider the argument that I have studied in my Masters'
thesis.9 In my thesis, I dealt with constitutional control adopting a
procedural notion of democracy. The debate between Ronald Dworkin and
Jeremy Waldron sheds some light on this matter."°
Ronald Dworkin is a well-known defender of judicial protagonism.
Through his theory of law, he attempts to bring to the dominion of judicial
interpretation the political morality present in the declarations of rights.
According to him, one cannot escape the moral arguments when reading
the constitutional text. Arguments dealing with fundamental rights, in this
sense, do not spring from utilitarian concerns or public policies. They
would be true arguments of principle.
It is from this notion of the legal phenomenon and adjudication that he
considers democracy. For him, democracy is not just a means for making
majority collective decisions. That would have just a statistical meaning.
Democratic regimes are those that, above all, treat every individual with
equal concern and respect. This is a substantive pre-condition for
democracy to be able to make majority decisions. It is the constitutional
court, through the judicial review, which will be able to safeguard this
ethical minimum of democratic regimes and submit the fundamental moral
questions to the forum of principle. To quote him briefly:
Would a charter of constitutional rights help to restore the British
culture of liberty?... "But though a written constitution is certainly
not a sufficient condition for liberty to thrive again in Britain, it
may well be a necessary one." "Would it offend democracy if a
British court had the power to strike down the blasphemy law as

9. "Controle de Constitucionalidade e Democracia," defended in the Political Science
Department of the University of Sio Paulo (2004).
10. The argument of Ronald Dworkin about constitution, democracy, and rights is complex
and is spread out through various parts of his work. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1978) ch. Constitutional Cases; RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OFPRINCIPLE (1985) chs. Political
Judges and the Rule of Law, The Forum of Principle; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986)
ch. The Constitution; RONALDDWORKN,ELDOMINIODELAVIDA (S.A. Ariel ed., Barcelona 1994)
ch. Constitutional Drama; RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: A MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2000); RONALD DWORKIN, A BI.L OF RIGHTS FOR BRrrAIN (1990);

Ronald Dworkin, Equality, Democracyand Constitution: We the People in Court, 28 ALBERTA L.
REv. 324-46 (1990).
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inconsistent with the Convention? No, because true democracy is
not just statiscal democracy, in which anything a majority or
plurality wants is legitimate for that reason, but communal
democracy, in which majority decision is legitimate only if it is a
majority within a community of equals. That means not only that
everyone must be allowed to participate in politics as an equal,
through the vote or through the freedom of speech and protest, but
that political decisions must treat everyone with equal concern and
respect, ..
Jeremy Waldron does not accept Dworkin's defense of the judicial
review. The sheer perception that the decision on abstract clauses of the
Constitution is a controversial task - one that raises an inescapable moral
disagreement - leads him to reject any kind of anti-majority device. He
asks a number of important questions which challenge common-sensical
constitutional theory, especially the notion that the need for democracy is
to guarantee minimum rights essential for its survival is a logical
consequence of the adoption of judicial review.
In those moments of moral disagreement - and they occur, rigorously,
every time that there is a decision that requires the Court to interpret
abstract constitutional clauses - there could be no other institutional
solution: either one respects the individual as an autonomous moral agent,
capable of making decisions on rights, or one seriously strays from the
democratic ideals of autonomy and self-government. Thus, in these
circumstances, one must respect those who represent popular sovereignty.
Above all, Waldron tries to show that the rejection of judicial review
as an institutional strategy for the protection of rights does not mean to
adopt a simplistic procedural notion of democracy, or to a na'fve
majoritarism, according to which decisions can have any content, provided
they are taken by the majority.'2 The debate on what a good decision is, on
the minimum substance of justice, does not disappear. However, when
there is a serious disagreement, it is imperative to establish the part
responsible for the decision. It is at this point that the right to participate
appears as the right of rights:
However, given the inevitability of disagreement about all that, a
theory ofjustice and rights needs to be complemented by a theory
of authority. Since people disagree about what justice requires and
11. RONALD DwoRKIN, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR BRrTAIN 14,35 (1990).
12. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (2001); JEREMY WALDON, THE DIGNITY
OF LEGISLATION (1999).
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what rights we have, we must ask: who is to have the power to
make decisions... ? The issue of what counts as a good decision
does not disappear the moment we answer the question "Who
decides?." On the contrary, the function of a theory of justice and
rights is to offer advice to whoever has been identified (by the
theory of authority) as the person to take the decision. 3
The dialogue between Waldron and Dworkin could be commented on
through two questions. The first one asks whether there is a right answer
in constitutional interpretation. The second asks if the judge would be the
more apt to find such answer.
Dworkin answers the first question in the affirmative. He concedes,
however, that it will not be always possible to demonstrate the veracity of
the answer. This inability to demonstrate it, nonetheless, should not mean
that there is no right answer. To Waldron, this intended moral objectivity
would be absolutely irrelevant. Whether the answer is right or wrong, what
Waldron is interested in is the fact that there is a disagreement. People
simply disagree, even after all the arguments have been presented and the
most demanding stages of public deliberation have been exhausted.
Why then not the judge or the lawmaker or any other arrangement of
a majority nature would be more apt than the others to find a morally more
cogent interpretation of the Court? Dworkin admits thatjudicial decisions
may be wrong. Still, he holds his ground, that law-makers would not be in
an adequate space to deliberate and to make decisions on principles, as the
judges would be. Waldron criticizes this position as mystifying. He sees
no reason why it should be assumed, from the perspective of the normative
theory, that lawmakers are necessarily self-serving or incapable of making
a decision on principles.
In this sense, the judicial review would guarantee not the supremacy of
the Brazilian Constitution, but that of the constitutional court. As the
Constitution is a text made of open norms, which require interpretation to
become concrete, it cannot be said that judicial decisions preserve its
supremacy. They would preserve, instead, the understanding that the Court
has of those open norms. Do these conclusions have any bearing on the
traditional ways of justifying constitutional control in a democratic
regime?
As I see it, from a theoretical point of view, it would only be possible
to propose the judicial review as an institutional device to safeguard the
supremacy of the Constitution (or the preservation of fundamental rights)
13. Jeremy Waldron, A Right-BasedCritique ofConstitutionalRights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 32 (1993).
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if one is ready to declare not only that the Brazilian Constitution admits a
right answer but also that the Court invariably finds this right answer. One
would have to commit himself to the presumption ofjudicial infallibility.
An over-enthusiastic celebration of the judicialization of politics may
hide a disregard for the procedural aspect of democracy. And here I do not
make a naive or purist defense of representative democracy. Contemporary
democracies have built a more complex arrangement than that of liberal
democracy, founded almost exclusively on political representation. To
understand it, we cannot be satisfied with an approach that focuses only
on the consequences of making political decisions legitimate (matters of
output), while at the same time, disregarding the procedural dimension
(matters of input).
When one discusses the prevalence of the Judiciary over the lawmaker
and sees in that a problem worth examining, what is really being discussed
is the procedural dimension of democracy. Therefore, before we think of
legitimacy expost, worried about the substance of political decisions, we
have to face the problem of legitimacy ex ante, establishing who gets to
decide and under what circumstances.
The discourse that defends judicial activism - provided it makes
progressive decisions - should be better criticized. Activism can be used
for good or bad ends and the canonical example for that can be found in
the history of the U.S. Supreme Court (i.e., the Lochner and Warren Court
Eras). A consistent theory of authority must rest on a previous procedural
agreement which must define who gets to decide, regardless of what it is
that will be decided. From a procedural standpoint, the judicial decision
is not necessarily the most defensible in highly controversial matters or,
to use Waldron's phrase, in matters of moral disagreement.
An institutional arrangement cannot be built on the premise of leaving
the responsibility of deciding to those reaching the right or best answer.
Decisional sovereignty is to be established procedurally, not substantively.
In moments of moral disagreement, there are no cognitive parameters to
prove one solution better than another. Thus, even more important than
establishing what has to be decided, it is paramount to determine who gets
to decide, regardless of the matter at hand. In this sense, the quest for a
procedural model of democracy cannot be left behind. Deprived from this
parameter, we could little more than accept that any power can make any
kind of decision, having as the only criterion of acceptance, its degree of
truthfulness.
It is important for democracy that progressive decisions are made, but
the question of who gets to make them is also significant. It may be hard
to defend this kind of argument looking at Latin American reality,
especially in a context in which the courts have played such an active role
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in the preservation of rights. But the enthusiasm with it cannot eliminate
the need of carrying on the task of designing more democratic
arrangements for collective decision making. Judicialization is not the only
answer for the crisis of representative democracy.
I do not suggest that the Judiciary stop acting as an important
counterbalance to majority politics or as a means of promoting a quality
institutional dialogue through the language of rights. Pushing Waldron's
argument to the limit may create this kind of risk. The paralyzing
deference to the "moral disagreement," departing point from which
collective decisions are made in contemporary politics, leads to a
conservative "answer, as one could say: 'it is irrelevant if the judicial
decision is better than that of the law-maker, once there is disagreement
on that; I know that,from aformalperspective of democracy, it is notfor
the judge to make this decision."' I just try to highlight the difficulties of
justifying such an overstretching of judicial activism.
This may seem a stale and even unpopular discussion, apart from not
being at the heart of the matters now relevant to Latin American
constitutionalism. It would be unacceptable not to acknowledge the role
of the Judiciary as a vital player who insurges against the lethargy of the
public powers. It has been playing a crucial part in the promotion of social
rights. Such activism generates enthusiasm, which I fully share. But this
excitement cannot make us forget the need for discerning the different
moments in which judicial decisions interfere with collective decisions.
In the case of amendments, as I have mentioned earlier, judicial
decisions invalidate the last institutional route the will of the majority has
to make itself heard. Admitting the judicial control of constitutional
amendments brings a serious institutional consequence: the Supreme Court
becomes the last link in the State decision circuit. I am not talking of a
context of parliamentary indecision or omission. On the contrary, it could
be a context of majority activism. When it controls constitutional
amendments, the Judiciary is not acting on a decision void, nor is the
representative system being defective. What happens is that there is a
conflict on different, possible interpretations of open clauses of the
Brazilian Constitution.
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